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B oth the United States and the Peoples Republic of China (PRC) are facing succession crises in the autumn of 2012. One will be resolved by democrat-ic elections, the other by democratic centralism. In both cases short-term 
and long-term strategies are at stake. In the short term, jockeying for power pro-
motes radical rhetoric for immediate domestic consumption and political gain, 
even though this rhetoric could be counterproductive for any effective long-term 
strategy in a globalised economy. Beyond the short-term, radically different ideo-
logical models are in conflict in both cases. In the US, a right-wing coalition of 
Christian fundamentalists and wealthy people who see no danger in restricting 
scientific research, social entitlement and civil empowerment, nor in eliminating 
the middle class, are seeking to dismantle the limited amount of social guarantees 
that were begun by the New Deal in the 1930’s, while an incumbent President 
whose re-election is uncertain is trying to defend them. In the PRC, a reform pro-
gramme based on liberalising the economy in order to generate wealth efficiently 
faces resistance from forces, inside and outside of the Party, that defend the redis-
tribution of wealth in order to guarantee social equity and State-centred control of 
the economy and the country.
The power struggle taking place within the Party-State in the run-up to the reno-
vation of its leadership in the 18th Chinese Communist Party National Congress 
next October, when  the “fifth generation” of leaders (Xi Jinping, Li Keqiang) will 
replace the current generation (Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao), has become visible as a re-
sult of the purging of Bo Xilai. The shock of Bo’s downfall has been called the most 
significant political event in China since 1989 and has been compared to the shock 
caused by the Lin Biao scandal in 1971. Lin was denounced for plotting to over-
throw Mao Zedong, who had named Lin his chosen successor. Lin was portrayed 
as corrupt and venal. Ideology was not associated with his actions. Now Bo is be-
ing portrayed as corrupt and ruthless. His wife is accused of conspiracy to murder 
and his son has been criticised for leading the life of a wealthy playboy. Ideology 
has been eliminated from the criticism of Bo Xilai by the official discourse on the 
matter, but the Bo Xilai scandal has strong ideological implications. The problem 
for observers and analysts is how to interpret these implications.
Succession is one of the oldest and most basic conundrums of Chinese political 
thought and practice. The Confucian tradition praised the ancient sage kings who 
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passed over their own sons in order to name morally good men to succeed them 
and criticised the practice of keeping the control of power within the family. This 
principle was enshrined in the meritocratic system of the imperial exams that co-
opted the best minds of each generation into the centralised bureaucracy. Today 
the two most significant factions within the Party-State are the children of veterans 
of the revolution, the 太子黨 taizidang or “princeling faction”, and the 團派 tuanpai 
or “League faction”. The princelings have enjoyed privileged access to power and 
wealth because of their family connections. The cadres who rose through the Com-
munist Youth League have achieved their current status through a screening proc-
ess based on their performance records (as well as their access to patronage). Some 
leaders combine both characteristics. The leading candidate to head the fifth genera-
tion, Xi Jinping, is taizidang, while the probable number two, Li Keqiang, is tuanpai.
Both Bo Xilai and his wife are princelings. Bo was an agile, charismatic and popu-
list politician who used Maoist slogans to preach social justice and gain popular 
support in subtle but apparent opposition to the liberalising policies of the main 
leadership. He was also ruthless, abrasive and authoritarian. He spied on the 
Party leaders and used rough arm tactics to control criminals, businessmen and 
rivals. He seemed destined to become a member of the new Standing Committee 
of the next Politburo but now he has fallen, and with him a “leftist” opposition to 
the “neoliberal” reformists. 
Wen Jiabao, his nemesis, who is not a princeling, denounced Bo for trying to bring 
back the Cultural Revolution, an event perceived by Party veterans as an attempt 
to destroy the Party by mobilising popular support outside the framework of Par-
ty discipline. Wen is the son of a school teacher. His parents were persecuted dur-
ing the Cultural Revolution. Bo and his father were imprisoned by Red Guards 
who killed his mother or drove her to suicide. Wen’s mentor was Hu Yaobang, 
Deng Xiaping’s first chosen successor. When Hu was ousted from power in 1987, 
by Bo’s father, among others, he was succeeded by Zhao Ziyang, who fell in 1989. 
Wen worked closely with both of them, and has tried to rehabilitate the name of 
Hu Yaobang.  Some suggest revenge as a motive for Bo’s downfall. Wen is also a 
charismatic and popular politician, referred to by the people as “Grandfather” 
Wen, and he has used the media to garner popular support ahead of the coming 
change in the leadership to promote the need for political reforms, reviving the 
agenda of Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang that was shelved in 1989. 
For analysts who favour guaranteeing social equity as the fundamental role of 
a Soviet-style Party that has renounced centralised planning of the economy in 
favour of market force efficiency, the purge of Bo Xilai seems suspiciously conven-
ient for disguising the imposition of an even more neoliberal policy, as suspicious 
as the strong coincidence between the official Party line on what has happened 
with the opinions expressed by leading Western communications media: that the 
Party has successfully avoided a return to Maoist practices and kept the reforms 
on keel. Others suggest a more long-term view: that the scandal has opened deep 
fissures in Party unity and revealed unsavoury aspects of Party practices to a gen-
eral public that will become increasingly less inclined to tolerate both growing 
social inequality and arbitrary and corrupt governmental management, with un-
foreseeable consequences for the political system.
